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The End of Argument 
 
Leo Groarke 
Trent University 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This short paper is exploratory. It aims to present an argumentation problem more than it aims to 
resolve it. At the end of the paper, I make some suggestions on productive and unproductive 
ways to manage the issues it implies, but my primary aim is the posing of the problem in a way 
that encourages others to participate in the discussion. 
 
I will understand arguing in the traditional way, as the giving of reasons (premises) for believing 
something (a conclusion). I will call the problem that interests me a "prolong" problem. It can be 
introduced by considering two different ways in which we might speak of the "end" of arguing. 
In studying argument or doing philosophy, we might understand the end of argument to be its 
ultimate goal – the telos it ultimately aims to achieve. In more practical circumstances, real life 
arguers often understand talk about the end of argument in a temporal way, as the point at which 
arguing stops – and ceases to be.  
 
In some special situations – when we practice philosophy or eristic or sophistical display – we 
might treat argument as an end itself. In such a context, we might speak of the "joy of arguing," 
much as we might in other circumstances talk about the joy of dancing or other recreational 
activities to which we are devoted. Considered from this particular point of view we might say 
that it is a positive, not a negative, if arguing does not end in our second, temporal sense. 
 
A very different attitude to argument accompanies most real life arguing, where arguing is not an 
end in itself, but a tool that arguers use to secure some other end. In most circumstances, that end 
can be described as the resolution of the disagreement, conflict, or dispute that precipitates 
arguing in the first place. Considered from this 'means to an end' perspective, arguments which 
serve their intended purpose stop at some point, coming to an end in the temporal sense when a 
disagreement is resolved. Pragma-dialectics provides a model of argument that understands the 
end of argument in this way, emphasizing an account of a "critical discussion" which aims to 
resolve some difference of opinion. 
 
Unhappily, the view that arguing is a response to disagreement which ends when it is resolved is 
at variance with many instances of real life arguing, including instances in which arguers are 
adept at arguing (sometimes professionally so). In such cases, arguments may lead, not to the end 
of arguing, but to further arguments. In such cases arguing does not settle a disagreement, but 
merely prolongs arguing, in some cases, to an almost interminable extent. I shall call this the 
"prolong" problem. It is a problem insofar as it arises in cases in which arguing exacerbates 
rather than reduces disagreement, often in ways that aggravate the conflict it attempts to resolve, 
increasing rather than decreasing the issues that it raises. 
 
2. The UK and the EU 
 In an attempt to understand the prolong problem it is useful to note that it is sometimes raised as 
an explicit issue in real life arguing, in circumstances in which worries and complaints about 
"endless" arguing play a major role in debate about arguing itself.  An illustrative example is a 
debate in the UK House of Lords when it addressed questions about the relationship between the 
UK Council of Ministers (the UK Cabinet) and the European Parliament, and the suggestion that 
a system of "co-decision" in which they share power can be the basis for government decisions. 
The following quote is from a speech by Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos, where he discusses a report 
that addresses these issues (U.K. Hansard, Vol. 531, 21 October 1991, Col. 1385). 
 
The report deals very sensibly with the issue of co-decision and concludes that the 
concept as between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament is 
"inherently unsound". In referring to that issue the noble and learned Lord 
summarised the report cogently and clearly in his excellent speech. We are 
grateful to him for that. 
 The report argues that the concept contains a fundamental flaw because if 
the Council and the Parliament disagree on a text neither has the last word. There 
could thus be endless argument between them and that is clearly undesirable. 
 
Lord Cledwyn's argument in the second paragraph is the claim that "co-decision" is not a viable 
way to manage disagreements between the U.K. Council of Members and the European 
Parliament because it gives neither party final authority and would lead to endless arguing rather 
than the resolution of their disagreements. 
 
Put in the terms I am using in this essay, Lord Cledwyn's claim is the claim that the co-decision 
model of joint governance is undermined by the prolong problem – which arises when arguing 
promotes indefinite arguing rather than the resolution of the disagreements it addresses. This is 
one example of the prolong problem in real life arguing.  I will return to this example at the end 
of this essay, but first I want to consider three other instances of the problem. 
 
3. Saturday Shopping: Fogelin and "Deep Disagreement" 
 
At first glance, the issues raised by the prolong problem might seem to be a variant of the issues 
raised by "deep disagreement," disagreement that does not allow a resolution. This is a notion 
that Fogelin (2005) has promoted within informal logic. My own view is that there are, for some 
of the reasons he suggests, deep disagreements that cannot be resolved by arguing, and that their 
existence does contribute to the prolong problem. But so do many other aspects of argumentation 
and it would be a mistake to equate deep disagreement and the prolong problem  When we 
consider real life arguing, the prolong problem is, for a number of reasons, an issue that is much 
broader and more pervasive than deep disagreement. 
 
Fogelin's account of deep disagreement emphasizes "normal" argument. According to his 
account, "an argument, or better, an argumentative exchange is normal when it takes place within 
a context of broadly shared beliefs and preferences" (6). Deep disagreement arises when 
argument is not normal in this way and argument becomes impossible. As he puts it, "the extent 
that the argumentative context becomes less normal, argument, to that extent, become 
impossible" (8). In his account he emphasizes that his thesis "is not the weak claim that in such 
[abnormal] contexts arguments cannot be settled. It is the stronger claim that the conditions for 
argument do not exist." (9) 
 
Unlike Fogelin, my focus is not situations in which "the conditions for argument do not exist" 
(whatever that means), but mainstream argument. I believe that arguing in such contexts 
sometimes bump against the deep issues he raises, but even when they don't, many real life 
arguments fail to settle the issues they address because they prolong argument instead of 
bringing it to an end, perpetuating an indefinite sequence of arguments and counter-arguments. 
To the extent that it exists, deep disagreement is located at the fringes of arguing, in situations in 
which normal and ordinary assumptions are called in question. In contrast, the prolong problem 
lives in the heart of our argumentative lives, where our ability to argue is not in question, but our 
ability to bring an end to arguing is a prevalent and common problem that frequently entails 
unsuccessful arguments that do not achieve what they are intended to achieve. 
 
Fogelin's own example of a "normal" argument is illustrative in this regard. 
 
A [out shopping] is asked why he is taking a particular road and he responds, " I 
want to pick up the fish last." We can imagine this being a conclusive reply. On 
the other hand, it might be met with the rejoinder, "No, go to the Grand Union 
last; I don't want the ice cream to melt." This too might be conclusive. But things 
could also become complicated. A might point out that the traffic that way is 
horrible this time of day, and it would be better to wait a bit to let it clear out. And 
he might be crushed by the reply "Today is Saturday." People being what they 
are, we can even imagine this discussion becoming quite heated. (5) 
 
Fogelin sees this as a normal argument because "the parties to the conversation share a great 
many beliefs and (if this is different) a great many preferences" (5) which "provide the 
framework or the structure within which reasons can be marshaled" – something which provides 
(in a Wittgensteinian way) "the thick sedimentary layer of the unchallenged" (5). 
 
We can see how the prolong problem arises if we consider another, equally likely, version 
Fogelin's normal argument, which is naturally associated with the kind of shopping trip that a 
husband and wife (let's call them A and B) might take on a routine Saturday. In such a situation, 
we can easily imagine their argument evolving as follows. 
 
A [out shopping] is asked why he is taking a particular road and he responds: " I 
want to pick up the fish last." 
B [A's spouse] may answer: "No, go to the Grand Union last; I don't want the ice 
cream to melt." 
A: "The ice cream can sit in the car with the other frozen items. I can't stand the 
smell of fish that clings to the car when we pick it up first." 
B: "I can't stand soft ice cream." 
A: "We got the fish first last time, this time we should it the way I want." 
B: "You get what you want every day of the week. On a Saturday it should be my 
turn." 
A: "What are you talking about? I don't get my way during the week..." 
 
This is a relatively simple argument, but it is not a simple argument to resolve. It is easy to 
imagine it prolonged indefinitely (comparing lists of who gets what, what A and B want, etc., 
etc.). Everyone knows couples in which the question who is treated better or worse carries on for 
years without any resolution – sometimes (sadly) until their own demise, when their physical 
condition, not arguing, brings an end to argument. In this and many other cases of interpersonal 
exchange, the prolong problem can easily evolve (and devolve) into endless argument. 
 
Why does my version of Fogelin's argument becomes a prolonged argument?  It is not because 
of deep disagreements of the sort that he discusses. For the two spouses share beliefs and 
assumptions and many preferences about the world – probably more than most people share 
given their relationship. Fogelin suggests "that for an argumentative exchange to be normal, 
there must exist shared procedures for resolving disagreements" (6). In this case, A and B 
disagree about a number of things (who got what they want when, who should get priority in the 
current situation, etc., etc.), but there is no reason to think that they do not satisfy this condition. 
Most importantly, they share an understanding of what it means to give a reason for believing 
something, know how to marshal evidence, know how to object to contrary perspectives, know 
that contradiction and inconsistency are untenable, and so on and so forth. 
 
One might criticize Fogelin's account of normal arguing and its ability to resolve disagreement 
by noting that he emphasizes easy cases. Consider his comment that: 
 
People often disagree over simple questions of fact, but, in general, they agree on 
the method for resolving their disagreement. If you think that Rod Carew hit more 
triples last year than George Brett, we can simply look it up.... Indeed, the 
reliability of official record books is assumed as part of the framework in which 
discussions of this kind take place. (6). 
 
This is a fair comment, but this is a very simple case of disagreement and it would be a mistake 
to imagine it as a good general model that illustrates our ability to resolve disagreement by 
arguing in real life contexts. 
 
An appeal to an authority of some sort is a standard, and often useful, move in ordinary 
argument. But two common features of real life argument frequently undermine the weight of 
such appeals. One is the extent to which experts and authorities can prove to be mistaken (the 
prevailing authorities in government and economics and the healthcare system did not foresee 
the 2008 financial collapse or the current COVID pandemic). The other is the lack of consensus 
which frequently characterizes the opinions of experts on topics that are the subject of 
disagreement and therefore argument (in ancient times, one of the standard tropes of the 
Pyrrhonean sceptics was a "mode of disagreement" which aimed to establish interminable 
disagreement between authorities). 
 
These issues often mean that we cannot end arguing in real life contexts by consulting a record 
book or some other catalogue created by an expert. In many circumstances such appeals only 
prolong arguing by raising questions – whether the expert in question is an authoritative expert, 
whether other experts agree or disagree with them, whether the issue in question is one in which 
expert opinion can be depended on, and so on.  
 
Above and beyond these issues, there are many situations in which appeals to authority cannot 
play decisive role in resolving disagreement. My version of Fogelin's Saturday shoppers is a case 
in point. For it arises because of the different preferences and wants that characterize different 
arguers. If A must choose between stinky fish or soft ice cream, A prefers putting up with soft 
ice cream. B prefers putting up with stinky fish. It goes without saying that there are many more 
important contexts (in trying to decide what house to buy, how to spend one's holidays, or 
whether the government should support this or that artistic endeavour) in which there are great 
differences that characterize the preferences of different arguers. They include, but are not 
restricted to, different preferences from a moral, aesthetic, gustatory, olfactory, etc. point of 
view. Argument does, in a variety of ways, influence such preferences but there is little reason to 
believe that it can eliminate the disagreement that they give rise to. 
 
Questions of meaning and the limits of our knowledge are other persistent features of real life 
arguing that make it easy to prolong an argument. The issue between A and B begins as a small 
one, but it grows and becomes one that it is almost impossible to resolve when it turns into the 
question whether A or B more of what they want. When we want to decide whether Rod Carew 
or George Brett hit more triples, we know what counts as a triple and we have very convenient 
records that allow us to tally who hit more.  
 
In the case of A and B, it is not clear what getting what one wants means (getting to make certain 
choices? getting something one wants from those choices? getting things one said one wanted 
when one made one's choices? etc.). And even if this was clear, there is no record book that 
itemizes all of A and B's wants and whether they have secured them.  Doing so would require a 
minute dissection of an enormous number of situations which are likely to be interpreted in 
different ways by A and B (their interpretations becoming, over time, a questionable memory). 
 
The myriad of issues that connect the issues addressed in argument provide many other ways to 
prolong arguing in real life contexts. It is relatively easy to determine whether Rob Carew or 
George Brett hit more triples in a year in major league baseball, but in most cases, such 
disagreements are tied to the broader, and more important question whether Carew or Brett was 
the better ball player, should be favoured in hall of fame votes, etc.  
 
If I favour Carew and we check the record books and find out that Brett hit more triples, then I 
need not relinquish my claims about Carew. Instead of ending the argument there, I can prolong 
it by saying that the number of triples a player hits is only one measure of their value, and that 
there are many other measures of equal (or possibly greater) importance. Some of the latter 
create more room for prolonged argument because they are complex and difficult to measure (for 
example, their role in the clubhouse, and their ability to influence other players in a way that 
makes the whole team better). 
 
Practical limitations on arguing exacerbate such issues. For real life arguing is characterized by 
limited time, energy and resources which make it difficult to develop extended arguments that 
can answer all the issues raised by prolonging arguments. Extending arguments to do so is in any 
case problematic given that every new argument raised adds complexities that can be made the 
subject of counter arguments which prolongs arguing even further. 
 
In this discussion, my aim isn't a catalogue of all the different ways in which arguers can prolong 
arguing. My second example of prolonged argument aims to illustrate the difference between the 
prolong problem and deep disagreement. Insofar as deep disagreement occurs at the boundaries 
of arguing – boundaries which can play a role in real life arguing – it can be a factor which can 
be exploited in attempts to prolong argument.  
 
That said, the prolong problem is a prevalent issue throughout real life arguing, not merely at its 
boundaries. The many reasons why include the very different preferences arguers assume (or 
defend); issues of meaning that can be used to raise questions about the meaning of an argument; 
our limited knowledge of the issues and circumstances that are the usual subjects of argument; 
the practical limitations that make it difficult to resolve all the issues which can be raised in 
prolonging argument; and the ability of arguers to exploit the connections between many 
different issues (and arguments) which are, in one way or another, associated with whatever 
disagreement arguing addresses. 
 
4. A Workplace Issue 
 
My first two examples of the prolong problem illustrate some ways in which it can arise in 
political decision making and interpersonal exchange. My third example is an actual case taken 
from my own world of work – labour issues within a university. It arose as a response to 
disagreement in a department characterized by a great deal of internal conflict. Ultimately it led 
to complaints of harassment against one of the professors in the department. 
 
When the complaints were presented to the professor in question, let's call them "Professor X", X  
denied that they were harassing the other members of the department. As often happens in these 
kinds of cases, X claimed that the situation was the reverse – that the rest of the department was 
harassing X. The departmental charge that X was practicing harassment was given as one 
example of the harassment X was facing. 
 
The university took the issues seriously and investigated. As is common in such situations, the 
evidence on what went on was to some extent contradictory, different individuals describing the 
same situations in different ways or, in some cases, accusing others of fabricating their accounts 
of what went on. Some very costly internal – and then external – investigations were conducted 
to try to get to the bottom of the situation. The union was involved, so were a number of lawyers, 
and counselors and medical doctors who gave evidence on pain and stress and other 
consequences for everyone involved. At one point, questions about the mental health of 
Professor X were investigated. At another, the department demanded that he not be allowed to 
visit department offices or talk to the department Chair. 
 
The investigations and the debate over the question whether Professor X (or anyone else) was 
guilty of harassment was carried on for more than two years. No agreement between the parties 
was ever reached on the question who, if anyone, was a victim of harassment. This was not for 
lack of argument or exchange. The Provost responsible for the investigation told me that she 
received, over two years, 1600 e-mails from Professor X. The total tally was much larger, 
including an onslaught of communications from the other professors, the union, lawyers, doctors, 
counsellors, and others connected to the case. She received so many e-mails that she seriously 
considered leaving her position so she did not have to continue to be involved in the prolonged 
argument. Whenever an argument was made for the conclusion that Professor X was guilty of 
harassment (and should be disciplined), he and those who supported him argued that such 
findings were malicious and further evidence that X was being persecuted. Here again, extended 
argument continually led, not to a resolution of disagreement, but to more arguing and 
heightened and more extensive disagreement. 
 
5. Pursuing Justice 
 
My first three examples of the prolong problem aim to illustrate how political arrangements, 
interpersonal differences of opinion, and workplace conflict can lead to instances of the prolong 
problem. The justice system is another arena in which it constantly arises. It is of special interest 
when we study argument, for it is a system designed for arguing, premised on the notion that we 
need to settle questions of guilt or innocence, responsibility and liability by arguing. To that end, 
it uses its (very considerable) resources to facilitate encounters between competing expert 
arguers (lawyers) whose arguing is overseen and judged by a senior, established expert in legal 
arguing and jurisprudence (a judge). 
 
Considered from this point of view, the justice system is committed to argument as the proper 
way to resolve conflict and disagreement. There is much to be said in favour of such a view – 
arguing being a better way to resolve disputes than many other alternatives (most notably, an 
appeal to force). At the same time, arguing in the courts frequently leads, not to the end of 
arguing and the rational resolution of whatever  motivated it, but to prolonged, endless arguing. 
 
The results of many famous trials illustrate this point. One is the legal wrangling that followed 
the death of William Jennens of the United Kingdom in 1798, a person who was described as the 
richest man in Britain at the time of his death. The trial over the estate he left behind began in 
1798 and finally ended one hundred and seventeen years later (in 1915), not because the issues 
raised at the trial (whether a planned but unsigned will was valid, who his rightful heirs were, 
etc.) were settled and resolved, but because the legal fees incurred in the legal proceedings at that 
point consumed the entire estate (estimated to have been over two million pounds). If more 
resources were available, there is every reason to believe the trial would be continuing today. 
 
This is an extreme instance of the prolong problem, but it would be a mistake to think that it 
arises in legal cases of this unusual sort. Rather, the tendency of arguing to produce more arguing 
rather than a resolution of the issues it addresses is a persistent one in the legal system. In some 
ways, this is not surprising. For one trait of a good lawyer is their ability to find creative ways to 
produce arguments which counter whatever arguments their opponent in the courtroom forwards. 
This  can be done in many ways – by finding holes in the opposing lawyer's arguments, by 
interpreting the law in a different way, by introducing new issues for argument, by presenting 
different kinds of evidence and counter-evidence, and so on. In situations in which two good 
lawyers argue against one another, this naturally leads to prolonged argument. 
 
In Canada, the prolong issue lies behind a Supreme Court decision (R. vs. Jordan, 2016) which 
concluded that the right to a fair trial in a criminal court includes the presumptive right to a 
judgment (in a provincial court) within 18 months of the date when the charges against a 
defendant are laid (and within 30 months in the case of a superior court). The decision was a 
direct – and somewhat exasperated – response to the justice system's tendency to prolong trials – 
and the arguing they entail. 
 
It is not hard to understand the reasoning behind the Jordan decision. Being charged with an 
offense is a serious matter which has many negative consequences for one's life. The judge who 
made the decision concluded that it is not fair to subject defendants to prolonged court cases, and 
tried to prevent this by legally forcing criminal courts to hear arguments from the prosecution 
and the defense, resolve the issues they raise, and have judges provide a decision which gave 
reasons for their own conclusions within an allotted time.  
 
Unfortunately, the Jordan decision had other unintended consequences. One has been a 
concerted attempt to use it to end legal arguing, not by resolving the question whether an accused 
is guilty of what they were accused of, but on the grounds that the arguments over this issue were 
continuing longer than the Jordan case allowed. In the three years following the decision, the 
result was thousands of Jordan appeals and the dismissal of some eight hundred cases. 
 
In part this was controversial because the cases thrown out included a number of serious cases 
that involved murder, manslaughter, and drug trafficking (see Russell 2019). In these instances, a 
Jordan application successfully stopped arguing and brought legal proceedings to an end, but not 
by argumentatively resolving them – i.e. by carefully considering the evidence for and against 
the claim that the accused was guilty of a crime.  Victims of the crimes in question complained 
that this way of ending these cases did not serve justice, and was arbitrary and ad hoc. 
 
In another way, the end result of Jordan was the worsening of the very problems it attempted to 
resolve. Instead of resolving the disputes the criminal courts were not resolving, it produced – 
more arguing. It did so by increasing the legal system’s argumentative burden by adding 
thousands of proceedings that have been required to address attempts to dismiss trials by 
appealing to the Jordan decision itself. This required extensive jurisprudence that sought to 
interpret the decision, specify when it does and does not apply, and apply it to particular cases, 
creating a whole new venue for complex arguing, prolonging rather than reducing the arguing in 
cases in the criminal court system. 
 
6. Ending Argument 
 
I have provided four examples that aim to illustrate what I have called the "prolong hypothesis" – 
the thesis that there are many real life situations in which arguments which cannot settle the 
issues they address because they do not bring an end to arguing by resolving the issues they 
address, but instead prolong it, by perpetuating an indefinite (potentially endless) sequence of 
arguments and counter-arguments.  
 
Above all else, the prolong thesis does not leave room for a naïve faith in traditional arguing as 
the right mechanism for resolving the issues and the disagreement it addresses within real life 
contexts. When we deal with real life arguing, it raises the question how we can manage the 
prolong problem in a way that promotes the resolution of the issues arguing addresses. With that 
in mind, I will end this paper by making four tentative suggestions in this regard – each one of 
them connected to one of the four examples I have emphasized. 
 
1. Many real life arguments take place within contexts (language games) governed by particular 
rules and decision making procedures.  Sometimes this is explicit, as in the courts and in 
government; sometimes it is implicit, as in interpersonal exchange within a member of one's 
family (where it may be understood that certain things can and cannot be broached). One 
important way to manage the prolong issue is by ensuring that such procedures are ones that 
restrain and do not exacerbate the prolong problem. In such a context, we need to seriously 
consider the ways in which our rules for regulating argument (by, for example, adopting the "co-
management" approach criticized in our first example) affect the prolong problem. 
 
2. The prolong problems that arise when we attempt to bring an end to argument highlight the 
extent to which arguing in the traditional sense may fail as an attempt to resolve disagreement. In 
situations in which this happens or seems likely, one thing we need to do is look beyond 
traditional arguing and find and use other ways of resolving disagreement. 
 
Within argumentation, there is one approach to argument which is of special interest in this 
context. It is Michael Gilbert's theory of "coalescent argument" (1997, 2014). It radically 
expands the traditional notion of argument so that it encompasses whatever exchanges bring 
about the coalescence of divergent points of view. As Gilbert points out, this can sometimes be 
achieved by rational considerations of the sort incorporated in the classical account of argument, 
but there are other conflicts which are better resolved by addressing the attitudes, feelings and 
intuitions of arguers in ways that don't conform to the classical conception of argument. To this 
end, Gilbert recognizes emotional, physical (visceral) and intuitive modes of arguing. 
 
In our second example, I would suggest that Gilbert's approach is more likely to resolve the 
issues between A and B (and the disagreements between other individuals in interpersonal 
relationships) than traditional arguing and its attempt to rationally weigh the evidence for one or 
the other's point of view. 
 
3. Our third example suggests that arguing has many practical limitations when it is adopted as a 
way to resolve institutional human resource issues. In some such circumstances arguing can be 
highly effective, especially when those on both sides of a dispute are open to the arguments of 
those they argue with, and committed to a resolution of their differences of opinion (attitudes 
which are not the same as a commitment to argument). In the case of Professor X it is, in 
contrast, naïve and wrongheaded to think that issues can be resolved as long as one provides the 
opportunity to argue long enough. Within institutions that may have hundreds, thousands, and 
sometimes tens of thousands of employees, more effective ways to manage the administrative 
burden that comes from prolonged argument by finding other ways to bring an end to 
disagreement that depend on something other than argument. 
 
4. In Canada, many responded to our fourth example, the Jordan case, by criticizing the 
government for not providing more resources to the criminal courts – resources that would allow 
the courts to handle more cases quickly (see Ebert 2018). Here it must suffice to say that this 
remedy fails to ask the kinds of questions I have been asking in this paper. For it assumes that the 
way to resolve the issues in the courts is to use resources to expand their operations and the 
arguing they emphasize. This raises two key questions. The first is the question whether this is 
too expensive a way to resolve the problems (because it would require very significant public 
expenditures that could possibly be used in better ways).  The second is the question whether this 
solution would actually work, or simply become another way to prolong arguing in the courts 
even further, as the Jordan decision has.  
 
It is at best naïve to assume that adding more professional arguers and more room for them to 
argue in the court system will bring an end to argument more quickly rather than prolong it. It 
might instead mean that arguing expands to occupy whatever space is made for it. With that in 
mind, a better way to address the problems that Jordan addresses is not by making room for 
more argument, but (as some commentators have suggested) by removing from the courts many 
of the conflicts, issues and disagreements that it currently attempts to deal with (minor offences, 
administration of justice offences, mental health issues, etc.), restricting trials to serious crimes. 
One way to prevent a traffic jam of prolonged arguing is by not allowing many of the current 
arguments not to get started in the first place. 
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